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Developing a Theologically Self-Reflexive 
Critique with Comparative Theologians 
and the Sociological Analysis of 
Pierre Bourdieii 
Colby Dickinson 
Abstract . — In this article I attempt to locate productive foundations for a critical 
theological methodology through engaging with both the inherently critical nature 
of comparative theology alongside the sociological, self reflexive analysis of Pierre 
Bourdieu. I turn, first, to comparative theology because it is a field with a height-
ened sensibility for how self-reflexive critique fiinctions within a theological context, 
as it assumes that both sides in any conversation maintain the possibility of 
re-examining their own premises and foundations. I turn, second, to the work of 
the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu because it is his analysis of symbolic poiver that 
provides an examination of self reflexive structures of understanding that might 
further assist theologians, comparative or not, to take up a critical theology from 
within the established traditions that constitute the field of theology proper. My 
argument is that theology has been beholden for far too long, centuries in fact, to 
non self reflexive structures of inquiiy. From our current vantage point, only a self-
reflexive, critical theology can properly endeavor to be a theological investigation, 
as this is the only way to understand the outplaying of the confessional content of 
the theological tradition. 
Prelude 
From the commentaries of Saint John of Avila on the Psalms, we hear 
this spiritual advice: "This is the order to follow with regard to the 
psalm's command to see: first, look at yourself; then at God; and then 
at your neighbor."' Sin, of course, and as Saint John notes, clouds any 
attempt at gaining 'self-knowledge', and can only be overcome by 
addressing not just one's past sins, but those committed every day.^ 
1. John of Avila, Audi, filia - Listen, 0 Daughter, trans. Joan Frances Gormiey 
(New York; Paullst Press, 2006), 175. 
2. Ibid. , 186. 
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A responsibility to the present is born within this line of sight. Examin-
ing the self, however, as Saint John also sees, can often lead to "great 
sadness, distrust, and faint heartedness."^ The cost of self-reflexive 
knowledge is measured by the loss of a certain security, in happiness, in 
trust and in 'strong heartedness'. But there is no other way to progress 
in the spiritual life; of this truth many saints are certain. Within the life 
called Christian, a turn to Christ becomes a necessary movement of 
abiding in faith, and the first step can be found in the penance under-
taken for one's sins.^ 
What Saint John of Avila points the believer toward is no less a 
paradigm for the spiritual life than it is for the theological understand-
ing. As Carl Raschke has described the context in which we are living 
theologically, we need a critical, or what I am calling a self-reflexive, 
theology more than ever in our current global order.^ Yet such a perspec-
tive is often noticeably lacking, leading theologians to make numerous 
alliances with political ideologies that not only threaten the basis of any 
ecclesial community, but also inhibit Christians from engaging with, as 
Saint John described it, the necessary first step in one's spiritual matura-
tion: recognizing the sin that lies, either active or latent, within one's 
self-knowledge. 
We have often heard i t said that Jesus was highly critical of the 
powers that be, of those structures and institutions in which he was 
raised and in which he both lived his life and established his ministry. 
As such, it is perhaps not much of a stretch to suggest that he promoted 
what many would consider to be a healthily self-critical understanding 
of his religious identity. I do not mean to suggest that Jesus himself was 
somehow flawed or sinful and so needed to be critiqued for an errant 
perspective of himself; rather, I suggest that he seems to have deliberately 
placed an emphasis on cleaning up his own (i.e. his Father's) house 
(as a form of self-identification) and to have adapted his actions accord-
ingly based on a critical reflection of those within his own religious tradi-
tion. Theologically, the very centrality o f the practice (the sacrament 
even) of confessing one's own sin, but also as they are somehow situated 
structurally within the history of Christianity, would seem to indicate 
that the inherent role of self-critique within Christianity is a central 
principle in living one's life of faith. I t is illustrated too by those 
3. John o f Avila, . 4 K a ' y , / / M , 199. 
4. Ibid. , 210. 
5. Carl A . Raschke, Critical Theology: hnroducing an Agenda for an Age of Global 
Crisis (Downers Grove, I L : InterVarsity Press, 2016). 
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provocative readings of scriptiire that allow us to see how even Jesus, in 
the Garden of Gethsemane, for example, probed the depths of God's 
own being, demonstrating some level of self-awareness as a form of self-
reflexive critique. At the very least, there is certainly a profound and 
complex relation to the self that Christianity calls for in asking people 
to die to themselves (e.g. Romans 6:6) that promotes a robust cause for 
self-examination, as Kierkegaard once put it.'^ 
The point of departure for any genuine confession of one's com-
plicity in sinful structures becomes more difficult to establish, however, 
when we stop to consider what it means to be self-reflexively aware in 
explicitly theological terms. That is, how exactly do we form and main-
tain what could be called a self-reflexive (critical) theology? Unfortu-
nately, the history of theology tells us that it is no easier to perform such 
a critique in theological terms than it is for any other discipline, though 
the seeds for self-examination should perhaps be that much easier to 
access given the stories and practices within both scripture and tradition 
that call theologians to take account of their words and actions so that 
they might be set upon the right path. 
In what follows I attempt to locate productive foundations for a 
critical theological methodology through engaging with both the inher-
ently critical nature of comparative theology alongside the sociological, 
self-reflexive analysis of Pierre Bourdieu. M y argument is essentially that 
theology has been beholden for far too long, centuries in fact, to non 
self-reflexive structures of inquiry - paths that allowed the theologian to 
abstract themselves from the arguments they were making. Because of 
this, and from our current vantage point, only a self-reflexive theology 
can properly be a theological investigation, as this is the only way to 
understand the outplaying of the confessional content of the theological 
tradition, as noted in the prelude above. Put simply, theology needs to 
become more attentive to exactly how it is to manifest a particular form 
of self-critique in the modern period beyond merely capitulating to a 
particular form of abstracted rationality. Indeed, as I hope to show, our 
access to something like grace might just depend on this movement 
toward greater self-awareness. In pursuit of a self-critical theology, and 
in league with numerous contextual theologies, though here proceeding 
solely from comparative theological and sociological points of view, 
I believe theologians must not shy away from those social, political and 
philosophical analyses that could better inform the field of theology 
6. Saren Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H . Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
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and its practices in order to more accurately observe and critique its all 
too frequently uncontested methods and models.'' 
As wi l l soon unfold, I turn first to comparative theology in this 
context because it is a field wi th a heightened sensibility for how self-
reflexive critique functions within a theological context, as it assumes 
that both sides in any conversation maintain the possibility of re-exam-
ining their own premises and foundations. I turn, second, to the work 
of Pierre Bourdieu because it is his sociological analysis of symbolic 
power that provides an examination of self-reflexive structures of under-
standing that might further assist theologians, comparative or not, to 
take up a critical theology from within the established traditions that 
constitute the field of theology proper. 
Comparative Theology as Self-refliexive Theological Praxis 
Because my approach to the formation of a self-reflexive model for theo-
logical inquiry is inherently comparative (in this instance explicitly 
involving political, social, philosophical and cultural methods of cri-
tique), I want to begin my assessment of the 'rubble' of theology - a 
term I borrow from Peter Admirand who utilizes the term in his survey 
of the fragmented field of theology today^ - by turning to comparative 
theology. Though in many ways it is not the central focus of the present 
study, but rather a strong partner wich what I am here undertaking, 
comparative theology, or a theological field chat begins with the assump-
tion that dialogue with what appears as 'other' has the power to alter 
one's own foundations and beliefs, is instrumental for any critical theo-
logical undertaking. Since I want to inspect the ways in which theology 
can divest itself of power and privilege in order to flow more seamlessly 
into other academic fields, subfields and disciplines in general, I begin 
with a motion toward comparative theology because it is, among all 
theological fields, particularly and methodologically attentive to the 
porousness of theological inquiry in ways that previous theologies have 
not been. I find recent comparative approaches particularly helpful as 
7. See Klaus Scholder, The Birth of Modern Critical Theology: Origins and Problems 
of Biblical Criticism in the Seventeenth Century, trans. John Bowden (London: S C M 
Press, 1990). 
8. Perer Admirand, Amidst Mass Atrocity and the Rubble of Theology: Searching for 
a Viable Theology (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2012). This fragmented field o f theology for 
Admirand stems, in part, f rom the many sources o f contemporary theology (e.g. contex-
tual, systematic, pastoral, biblical, liturgical, ethical and so forth). 
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they have the ability to incorporate political and social analysis as part 
of their elaboration of ever more creative methods and models for the 
articulation of theological insight.' In this particular context, I want to 
make use of the work of the comparative theologian Hugh Nicholson 
before linking his work to a more robust depiction of the 'rubble' of 
theology that is left to us today and that lies underneath any truly critical 
theology - 'rubble' that might just, in the end, prove to be the only 
building blocks worth assembling into something we might find to be 
usable. 
In short, comparative theology has offered theological inquiry on 
the whole an opportunity to delve into its own (revealed) foundations 
by not only entering into dialogue with other religious traditions, but by 
turning any insight gained through inter-religious dialogue back upon 
its own claims and beliefs, presenting the theologian engaged in such 
conversation with more than simply hermeneutical nuance. They are 
rather presented with the opportunity for self-transformation through 
the confession of their faith and their religious failings at the same time. 
To admit this possibility of transformation is at the same time, as I wi l l 
discuss later more fully, to admit the inherently political elements 
embedded within already established theological doctrines and tradi-
tions. By starting from this premise, comparative theology allows its 
practitioners to put themselves 'at risk', so to speak, in order that per-
sonal and communal self-understanding might be a dynamic and trans-
formative experience, not simply an academic conclusion. 
What I find especially intriguing in Nicholson's assemblage of the 
political and the theological in the service of comparative theology comes 
in the form of his tackling the issue of self-reflexiveness through an 
emphasis placed on the task of 'denaturalizing' as a contestation of cur-
rently existing political portraits of nature.'" By taking a different 
approach to the political uses of the belabored concept of the 'natural' 
9. See, for example, Francis X . Clooney, Comparative TIjeology: Deep Learning 
across Religious Borders (Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, 2010). I am particularly struck, as 
well, by the way in which interreligious dialogue can help f ru i t fu l ly develop a more 
'vulnerable theology', as i t is termed by Marianne Moyaert in her In Response to the 
Religious Other: Ricoeur and the Fragility of Interreligious Encounters (Lanham, M D : 
Lexington, 2014). 
10. Hugh Nicholson, Comparative Theology and the Problem of Religious Rivaby 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). For similar thematics in his work, see his 
recent article "Social Identit) ' Processes in the Development o f Maximally Counterintui-
tive Theological Concepts; Consubstantiality and No-Self," Journal of the American 
Academy of Religion 82, 3 (2014); 736-770. See also Clooney, Comparative Theology, 
50-51. 
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in religion, he is able to carefully and critically subvert the ways in which 
identity itself is protected against ail difference through its establishment 
as being itself 'natural'. He recognizes in this approach to 'nature' that 
this is the starting point one must begin with i f one is to take seriously 
the already constructed boundaries and borders which are legitimated as 
'natural' by those defined by them and who often, in turn, defend their 
existence. 
Following closely the works of both Karhryn Tanner and Daniel 
Boyarin in particular, Nicholson presents a way for "faithfulness to the 
Word of God" to move "against the formation of sharp cultural 
boundaries,"" exposing not just the problematic divisions between reli-
gious identities and traditions, but also the highly problematic existence 
of disciplinary borders. Such insights progress, in fact, from the essence 
of Christian proclamation which sought to eradicate the existence of 
exclusivism. Going back to the ever problematic division between Jews 
and Christians, for example, he finds that: " [ . . . ] the doctrine of Jesus 
Christ as the Word of God is deeply implicated in the history of Jewish-
Christian apologetics and thus inseparable from the issue of Christian 
boundary formation."'^ To think beyond the desire for such boundary 
formations means by implication having to go back to the originary 
impulse for identity itself and the way it is often 'grounded' in a point 
of 'origin' for a religious tradition. 
Just what exactly constitutes systematic theology and what inter-
religious dialogue becomes in this context somewhat of a moot point, as 
comparative theology engages both most readily. Perhaps the breakdown 
berween these divisions is, in this sense, for the best, as this breakdown 
promotes a vulnerability thac might actually enable theology to dialogue 
with other disciplines and other religions in ways it has never quice yec 
done. What is remarkably clear however, is that the turn that Nicholson 
takes, citing Tanner's work - and this is what I would like to highlight 
as an incisive movement into the inherently self-reflexive nature of theo-
logical inquiry - is one made toward the "differences within cultures as 
opposed to the differences among cultures."'^ In short, and to borrow 
the language of Giorgio Agamben, who uses this phrase in the context 
of Pauline thought,'^ we are presented with a 'division of division itself, 
11. Nicholson, Comparative Tloeology and the Problem of Religious Rivalry, 89. 
12. Ibid. , 90. 
13. Ibid. , 95. This idea is borrowed f rom Kathryn Tanner, Theories of Culture: 
A New Agenda for Theology (Minneapolis, M N : Fortress Press, 1997). 
14. Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the 
Romans, trans. Patricia Dailey (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
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a self-critical mechanism that divides from within the cultural divisions 
already present in our world. That is, the comparative approach that 
theology needs to learn to adapt, by this reading of things, is one that 
looks outward only from the difference within itself, not necessarily the 
difference external to it. Theology needs perhaps in this case to die to 
itself before it can find new life, as the Gospels and Paul's letters had 
phrased it, and no matter what such a thing may entail in the end for 
the future and practice of theology (especially in a comparative sense). 
Not only does such a move bring the contingent nature of these bounda-
ries to light, it also allows us to critique theology's historically hegemonic 
engagements.'^ 
For his part, Nicholson is able to immediately turn such an insight 
around, back on itself in fact, in order to stress the political elements 
at work within Christian constructions of the self before engaging in 
the essential tasks of comparative study. As he phrases it, "Conversely, 
a demonstration of the contingency and mutability of cultural bounda-
ries attenuates the essentializing characterizations of self and other that 
interfere with the recognition of the multiplicity of voices within each 
cultural formation."'^ In other words. Christians have been guilty more 
or less throughout history of silencing the 'multiplicity of voices' within 
their oivn tradition in order to promote a particular, hegemonic narrative 
of Christianity, likely in a particular 'orthodox' version. It is not a far 
leap in light of such an analysis to advocate for an anti-essentialist meth-
odology of 'cross-cultural comparison' for today's globalized world that 
focuses upon the 'political' elements centrally located, but also masked 
within, theological practice in order to more justly consider any religious 
identity that presents itself before us.''' We are witnesses in this proce-
dure to methods of cross-cultural comparison as they become forms of 
critical self-reflexive understanding.'^ The main point in all of this analy-
sis is not that we necessarily begin with an external or internal critique 
15. "The recognirion o f t h e internal diversity o f a cultural formation like Chris-
tianity reveals the largely contingent and arbitrary nature o f the cultural boundaries 
delimiting it f rom its surroundings. For [ . . . ] the differentials upon which such boundar-
ies are founded invariably reflect hegemonic relations wi th in each of rhe delimited forma-
tions." Nicholson, Comparative Theology and the Problem of Religious Rivaby, 95. 
16. Ibid. , 95. 
17. See ibid. , 13. 
18. "The comparative juxtaposition o f cultural-religious formations sets up reso-
nances berween the two whereby prominent features o f the one bring to light parallel 
features o f the other that may have been suppressed by various hegemonic discourses, 
whether those of indigenous orthodoxies or chose of Western scholarship. In this way 
cross-cultural comparison can bring to light parallels that cut across established cultural 
boundaries, thus revealing the latter's arbitrariness and contingency." Ibid. , 95. 
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of our idendty, but that an internal critique must be the end goal, one 
that demonstrates the diff icult fracturing of identity that already lay 
within us. 
To profit f rom this re-alignment of comparative inquiry that ends 
up re-focusing on the internal shifts in identity, we must also recognize 
that such an endeavor is not made in order to abandon the embedded-
ness of a given tradition's theological foundations and its own efforts 
roward forming an apologetics, but to try to yet locate, in Nicholson's 
words, a "deconstructive moment of the dialectic of identity," again, 
within traditional religious structures and cultures.'' This is Nicholson's 
subtle shift from attempting to 'depoiiticize' Christian identity to 'denat-
uralizing' it , which is a demonstrably political tactic in another 
direction.^" 
I am reminded at this point in my sketch of a comparative approach 
of the controversial terrain of political theology, one that begins with 
a critique of self-identity, so that we might see not only the failures of 
natural theology, but mainly of the highly problematic use of the cate-
gory of the 'natural' and the way in which it is almost inevitably accom-
panied by a defensive posturing that has no place within theological 
reasoning.^' We see such a position brillianriy on display in the work of 
H . Richard Niebuhr, for example.^^ I hear a similar voice of caution in 
those who would share in the impulse not to fear the secularization of 
our world (though not necessarily to embrace it either), but simply to 
realize that identities are far more complex than we often represent them, 
encompassing so many facets as to literally be unrepresentable in their 
Cotality.^^ I am encouraged on this score as well to see political theology 
and inter-religious dialogue not solely as mediators of an impasse within 
theological methods, but as central ways of 'doing theology' in the first 
place, a shift in perspective that I believe has been going on for some 
dme now, but is sdll long overdue in being seen as a significantly central 
method of a more universal theological insight. 
What I am discussing here specifically, and as I wil l relate to the 
work of Pierre Bourdieu in a moment, concerns how the integration of 
19. Nicholson, Comparative Tiieology and t/je Prol>/em of Religious Rival)y, 104. 
20. Ibid. , 12. 
21 . See the way in which denaturalization is dealt w i th in Dawne Moon , God, Sex 
and Politics: Homosexuality and Everyday Theologies (Chicago, I L : University of Chicago 
Press, 2004), 231. 
22. O n removing the defensiveness f rom theological discourse, see H . Richard 
Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (Louisville, KY; Westminster John Knox, 2006). 
23. Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, M A ; Belknap Press, 2007). 
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various fields and subfields of theological inquiry might lead not to a 
fortification of each religion's boundaries, but to an openness toward 
each becoming vulnerable co the other, even at the risk of being swal-
lowed up whole. Such a form of ontological poverty, as I would call it, 
could even be read as imploring each 'division' (e.g. ethical, systematic, 
pastoral, sacramental, historical, biblical, etc.) to cede ground to the 
other, and, moreover, to welcome the other (with their own unique 
'methods' and focal points) into our midst. This would be not only an 
exemplary manifestation of hospitality, but also of bearing a form of love 
that lets the other - to incorporate Levinas's language ~ take it hostage, 
that lets itself be overcome. 
Towards a 'Pathetic' Theology as Self-reflexive Theology 
"What Nicholson is gesturing coward, I would argue, is a domain some-
what familiar to theological inquiiy over the past half-century or more. 
I t is a topography that goes under a variety of labels, but which we more 
or less discern at work in Abraham Joshua Heschel's 'pathetic' theology,^'* 
John Caputo's 'weak' theology,^^ Dan Barber's recent attempts to depict 
theology as permanently ' in diaspora'^'' or Jiirgen Moltmann's reading 
of Christianity as a form of 'permanent iconoclasm'.^'' I think it is also 
present in various shades within Dietrich Bonhoeffer's efforts to formu-
late a 'religionless Christianity'.'^^ I t is to the resonance that I sense 
within these political theological efforts that I wish to turn, as the dia-
logue that ensues wil l hopefully open up a path we might walk more 
fully along toward the ultimate poverty of theology. 
In the wake of the Second World War and the Shoah, certain phil-
osophical and theological trends began to take account of the radical 
alterity of the other in ways that had not been done before. Figures with 
innmate knowledge of the war and its effect upon the peoples of Europe 
began to stake new territory in exploring just how 'otherness' itself - the 
24. Abraham Heschel, The Prophets (New York: Harper, 1962). 
25. John D . Caputo, The Weakness of God: A Theology of the Event {yi\oon\\np.on, 
I N ; Indiana University Press, 2006), 
26. Daniel Colucciello Barber, On Diaspora: Christianity, Religion, andSecularity 
(Eugene, OR: W i p f & Stock, 2011). 
27. Jiirgen Mol tmann , The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation 
and Criticism of Christian Theology, trans. R. A . Wilson and John Bowden (Minneapolis, 
M N ; Fortress Press, 1993), 87. 
28. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, ed. John W. de Gruchy, 
trans. Isabel Best et al. (Minneapolis, M N ; Fortress Press, 2010). 
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foreigner, the refugee, the stranger, the marginalized figure - must lie 
at the heart of our self-identifications, even, and perhaps especially, 
when they undo our identides from within. Such undertakings were 
done of course while recognizing the inherent risk that we might repeat 
the same mistakes i f we were again to fail to notice how we are never 
able to construct an undeconstructible identity {the impossible dream 
of the sovereign self). A new view on comparative studies, it could be 
argued, began to cake hold of us as the dialectic between self and other 
became much more real than had been embodied beforehand. Previ-
ously exclusive historical and national narratives were forced to confront 
their very concrete 'other'. In this light, Theodor Adorno's refashioning 
of dialectics into a 'negative' mode, which had a significant impact upon 
Moltmann's theology and a number of emergent contextual theologies, 
would, to my mind, stand as one such exemplary moment.^' 
Following this line of thought, Feter Admirand's Amidst Mass Atroc-
ity and the Rubble of Theology: Searching for a Viable Theology may have 
directly set out to reinvigorate the relevance of theodicy for theological 
reflection. However, his book ends up providing, in my opinion, an equal 
or greater service that we should here call to the fore of the discussion: 
recognizing the rubble of theology points the way toward a humbler 
theology, one attuned to the inherent fragmentation of both our thoughts 
and our world, and one therefore focused on the suffering of others that 
permeates every human existence. I believe that as such theology partici-
pates with both Nicholson and Adorno in trying to fashion a somewhat 
negative dialecdc in the face of the disintegration of traditional borders 
and boundaries. "When Admirand speaks of the 'rubble of theology' as 
such, he imphes the performance of theology in the midst of 'violence 
and injustice', and as it finds a renewed sense of hope for the discipline 
within the theological 'explanations and systems that have ultimately 
failed to address or admit their loss'.^° This is a realization that will cause 
him at points throughout the work to glance at the gaps or holes within 
his own Catholic theological background, embracing rather than shun-
ning such 'failures' as potential sites for dialogue with those many 'others' 
who speak from 'outside' its perceived boundaries, 
Beyond Admirand's take on theology today, another significant 
voice, and one just as relevant to theological discourse, lies in the work 
29. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (London: Con-
tinuum, 1973). See roo the study of this narrative at the origins of contemporary political 
theology as i t unfolds i n David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology 
and the Culture of Pluralism (New York: Crossroad, 1998). 
30. Admirand, Amidst Mass Atrocity and the Rubble of Theology, xv-xvi. 
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of the Jewish philosopher Emmatiuel Levinas. There is a certain 'excess' 
to our humanity, as Levinas once demonstrated, that unsettles us and 
prompts us to try to reduce the 'Other' before us in ways that undermine 
the 'Other's' very humanity. The Levinasian task, however, is to access 
a revitalized notion of transcendence, but only as gained through the 
immanent Other(ness) before us, a sort of 'transcendence-in-immanence' 
that characterizes his work throughout.^' In his work, though this simply 
reiterates a point I find present underneath Nicholson's work as well, 
care and responsibility toward the Other become inherently political 
acts insofar as they directly call into question humanity's reliance upon 
warfare and the dehumanization of those who differ f rom the collective, 
and warring, 'us'. 
In this context, Nigel Zimmermann has pursued a discussion of rhe 
nature of hospitality in Levinas' work in relation to Christian theology, 
as well as how 'evil' arises from a denial of our responsibility for the 
Other, that I fmd to be particularly helpful in this regard.According to 
Zimmermann's reading, letting the Other present itself (him or herself) 
to us is a strictly phenomenological exercise, and one that gives shape to 
Levinas' philosophy, though it is also clear that, despite such an appear-
ance, the Other is never fully known by us, and in fact remains perma-
nently unknown in its radical otherness, calling us to act ethically in 
defense of its alterity. As such, the problem which humanity faces lies not 
in trying to identify the Other — this is a distraction and even an abstrac-
tion that need not be performed, which is also a point that only bolsters 
Nicholson's claims on the importance of comparative theology - but in 
ethically responding to the Other, a situation that brings into being a 
certain permanently 'de-centered subjectivity'.^^ What Zimmermann 
concludes is that Levinas disturbs theology, not as one who uncovers 
decaying foundations and unreliable pillars, but as one who discovers the 
poor man in the dark and wakes him up with warm clothes and food. 
The provocation of Levinas is such that the poverty of one's own position 
is unmasked, not for rhe sake of puWic humiliadon, but for moving past 
facades and healing the fragile body one finds there.^'' 
What I hear in this theological reading of Levinas is, again, the need 
to move through the 'rubble' of theology, not to strive for a seemingly 
3 1 . See, e.g., Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, 
trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969). 
32. Nigel Zimmermann, Levinas and Tiieologf (London: Bloomsbur)' T & T Clark, 
2013). 
33. Ib id , , 24. 
34. Ibid. , 81 . 
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unblemished, systematic or comprehensive defense of an abstract tran-
scendence that never existed as such in the first place, but to continue 
emptying i t out, to 'impoverish' theology even fiirther. Our task as theo-
logians, as Jean Vanier reminds us, is one of'littleness' and not of legiti-
mating a sovereign politics that masquerades as a theological or religious 
observation on the 'nature of things'.^' Levinas, for his part, brings forth 
a meditation on the 'littleness' of the faith of Israel in its desire to stick 
to its own particular traditions and revelations, something of the 'neces-
sary humility' that Israel might accept in the face of God and those 
Others standing before them.''' What he finds is that "The election of 
the Jew, and the whole people of Israel, is a calling out of the self towards 
the Other"^^ - a suggestion that opens up his entire philosophy toward 
theology at the same time as it withdraws and challenges theology from 
a certain distance. Providing a nice bridge between Levinas' philosophi-
cal and Jewish writings, Zimmermann points out how " [ . . . ] it is for 
Levinas a central Jewish tenet that an authentic community of faith is 
guided not by dogmatic content, let alone a theology, but by the self-
sacrificial relationship of persons."''^ To think theology as a continuous 
process of going beyond theology, perhaps as a kenotic theology that 
pours itself out into other disciplines and other fields, is actually central 
to doing theology — a practice that concretely appears as a form of weak-
ness and, to some no doubt, of the loss of identity. 
In truth, however, what is to be discovered there is only another 
form of identity altogether, a true strength in what appears to be a 
weakness, a point Saint Paul knew all too well, Zimmermann concludes 
with the affirmation that God, according to Levinas, can be recovered 
after the Shoah, but only in terms of human inter-subjecrivity (hence, 
comparatively), not through the reassertion of an onto theological claim 
concerning God's being. As such, "Theology is not itself a glory, but a 
task in which the Other is glorified"^' — a proposition that theologians 
still need to think through a good deal before they wi l l be able to 
proceed to the next phases of theological insight. In each of these analy-
ses, the task of theology is thoroughly comparative, or, in other words, 
relational and transformational, and so wil l always be at once political, 
social, philosophical, cultural and economic. 
35. Jean Vanier, Community and Growth, rev. ed. (New York: Paulist, 1989). 
36. Zimmermann, Levinas and Theology, 109. 
37. Ib id . , 125. 
38. Ib id . 
39. Ib id . , 161. 
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But how are we to access these roots o f theological self-critique 
directly? W i l l such roots be entirely theological in origin, or will they 
have come to us from other disciplines? Or, as I have already been sug-
gesting, wil l there be little need to discern exactly where they come from 
so long as chey are capable of addressing the presence of a permanent 
otherness within the theological? Are they perhaps as likely to derive 
from the dialogues of comparative theological approaches brought about 
external to a given religious cradition as they are from within it? 
Pierre Bourdieu and a Self-reflexive Theology 
I f Nicholson and Zimmermann call our attention to the inherendy 
comparative or inter-subjective nature of theological inquiry, the work 
of Pierre Bourdieu adds to the conversation a sense of how the individual 
is able to comprehend their identity in relation to communal identity 
and thereby to develop a self-reflexive form of understanding that theol-
ogy might fmd useful. In Bourdieu's analysis of mascuhne domination, 
as but one example of where this takes place, and in his various attempts 
to 'objecdfy objecdvity' or to strive for objectivity but realize too that 
we wil l never be able to achieve it, we might find a suitable correlation 
to what Judith Butler has been advocating as giving a critical account 
of oneself This is to suggest the promotion of a certain sense of self 
reflexivity in establishing one's personal identity.''" Taking his unending 
40. O n the concept o f self-reflexiviry, see also Anthony Giddens, The Constitution 
of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990). Bourdieu's specific contribution to forming a theological conception o f 
self-reflexivity is explored in D . F. Piiario, Bacl^ to the Rough Grounds of Praxis: Exploring 
Theological Method with Pierre Bourdieu (Leuven: Leuven University Press and Peeters, 
2005) and in T. Howland Sanks, "Homo Theologicus: Toward a reflexive theology (with 
the help o f Pierre Bourdieu)," Theological Studies 68 (2007): 515-530. For a general 
religious engagement wi th Bourdieu's work, see Terry Rey, "Marketing the Goods of 
Salvation: Bourdieu on Religion," Religion 34 (2004); 331-343. I t should likewise be 
noted that the continuity between Butler's position on hom(m)osociality leading to self-
critique and Bourdieu's notion of self-reflexivity is, in a general sense, consistent, and 
provides a unique opportunity ro transcend tradiriona) disciplinary boundaries in the 
hopes o f providing further justification for the theories presented by both authors. C f 
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (London: Routledge, 1999). Butler's own analysis of 
Bourdieu's work, despite her criticisms o f his depiction o f performativity, seems to ind i -
cate thac such a correlation is indeed possible. See her article on Bourdieu entitled 
"Performativity's Social Magic," in Bourdieu: A Critical Reader, ed. Richard Shusterman 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 113-128. A t the same rime, Bourdieu's analysis of gender 
relations is not without its complications and share of critics. See, among others, Lisa 
Adkins, "Reflexivity: Freedom or Habit o f Gender?," Theory, Culture and Society 20, 6 
(2003): 21-42; Howie Chodos and Bruce Curtis, "Pierre Bourdieu's Masculine 
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attempts to establish reflexive identities within the many social contexts 
in which he studied them, we can see how Bourdieu's account of self-
reflexivity is not simply borne individually, but is that which is, as he 
points out, collectively assessed; it is the step f rom an T to a 'We' that 
is essential to forming identity as such.'^' For Bourdieu, the roots of 
one's self-identification are to be traced to one's position in a collective 
'we', engulfing the T and yet respecting its uniqueness so that an 'objec-
tive' view of the self might emerge. Fulfill ing the role which one's com-
munity has traditionally played, the 'collective', as he terms it, adapts 
the practices of everyday life as a critical instance of regulating self-
identity. As he puts it, "Reflexivity takes on its fu l l efficacy only when 
it is embodied in collectives which have so much incorporated it that 
they practise it as a reflex.'"*^ Such a reflex is intended to be a step 
toward liberating each person of the unconscious bias linked to their 
social position(s), and fiom which issues the point of view that has 
become 'the illusion of absoluteness' f rom which only a collective can 
restore any 'objectivity'.^' 
To borrow a term normally associated with Butler's work, we might 
say that the 'performance' of one's identity is only critically engaged 
Domination: A Critique," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 39, 4 (2002): 
397-412; Jo-Anne Dillabough, "Class, Culture and the 'Predicaments o f iVIasculine 
Domination ' ; Encountering Pierre Bourdieu," British Journal of Sociology of Education 
25, 4 (2004); 489-506; Bridget Fowler, "Reading Pierre Bourdieu's Masculine Domina-
tion: Notes Towards an Intersectional Analysis o f Gender, Culture and Class," Cultural 
Studies n, 3/4 (2003); 468-494; Johan Heilbron, "Reflexivity and Its Consequences," 
European Journal of Social Theoiy 2, 3 (1999); 298-306; Leslie McCall , "Does Gender 
Fit? Bourdieu, Feminism, and Conceptions o f Social Order," Theory and Society 2 1 , 6 
(1992): 837-867; Lois McNay, "Gender, Habitus and the Field; Pierre Bourdieu and 
the Limits of Reflexivity," Theoiy, Culture and Society 16, 1 (1999); 95-117; Gad Yair, 
'"Vive la (Sexual) Revolution; The Political Roots o f Bourdieu's Analysis o f Gender," 
The Sociological Review 56, 3 (2008): 388-407. See also the critical essays gathered in 
Feminism After Bourdieu, ed. Lisa Adkins and Beverley Skeggs (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2004). 
4 1 . From a sociological standpoint, w i t h i n which Bourdieu locates himself, a 
" [ . . . ] reflexive analysis must consider successively position in the social space, position 
in the field and position in the scholastic universe. How, without surrendering to narcis-
sistic self-indulgence, can one apply this programme to oneself and perform the sociology 
o f oneself, one's self-socioanalysis, given that such an analysis can only be a starting point 
and that the sociology o f the object that I am, the objectivation of my point of view, is 
a necessarily collective task?" Pierre Bourdieu, "Sketch for a Self-analysis," in Science of 
Science and Reflexivity, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge; Polity, 2004), 94. See also, in 
general, Tony Schirato and Jen "Webb, "Bourdieu's Not ion of Reflexive Knowledge," 
Social Semiotics 12, 3 (2002): 255-268. 
42. Bourdieu, "Sketch for a Self-analysis," 114. 
43. Ibid. , 116. 
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from a collective of whicli one is a part.'*'̂  The problems exposed by 
this performative issue of one's subjectivity is, however, only part of a 
larger representational schema of power that Bourdieu is quick to decon-
struct in his work as a whole, even, and perhaps more importantly for 
self-reflective purposes, as it invests itself in his own disciplinary (socio-
logical) boundaries.'*' This self-reflective gesture allows Bourdieu to 
maintain that a struggle inherently lies at the center of social analysis 
itself one between those who unveil how their beliefs distort their per-
spective and those who have a vested interest in keeping those interests 
purposely veiled. This is to say too that the 
[...] relationship between [economic] distributions and [symbolic] 
representations is both the product and the stake of a permanent 
struggle between those who, because of the position they occupy 
within the distriburions, have an interest in subverting them by modi-
fying the classifications in which they are expressed and legitimated, 
and those who have an interest in perpetuating misrecognition, an 
alienated cognition that looks at the world through categories the 
world imposes, and apprehends the social world as a natural world.'*'' 
In what can only seem like a direct homage to Butler's fundamental 
insights concerning the parody and performance of gender, as well as 
Nicholson's task of'de-naturalizing' as a form of'de-politicizing', what 
appears as 'natural' to one social classification system may be a construct 
wholly unnatural to the other it is placed upon, wi th the (designed) 
intentions remaining unknown to those receiving such an imposition. 
This is done, according to Bourdieu, for various reasons, most notably 
to express the interests of the dominant who are able to maintain 
(hegemonic) control by obfuscating and masking the uses of power and 
authority. Taking critical action to counteract the imposition of a falsely 
legitimated dominance, Bourdieu highlights however how social science 
specifically must re-categorize its systematic analysis of social structures 
by maintaining a firm solidarity with the more subversive elements of its 
study. This is potentially the case, he wil l argue, because the "specific 
efficacy of subversive action consists in the power to bring to conscious-
ness, and so to modify, the categories of thought which help to orient 
44. C f Butler, Gender Trouble, 171 ff . 
45. See Bourdieu's remarkable performance o f the self-reflexivity possible wi th in 
a university setting in Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus, trans. Peter Collier (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), as well as his study o f the men f rom his home 
region of France in his Tlje Bachelors' Ball: The Crisis of Peasant Society in B^arn, trans. 
Richard Nice (Chicago, I L : University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
46. Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford, CA; 
Stanford University Press, 1990), 140-141. 
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individual and collecdve practices and, in particular, the categories 
through which distributions are perceived and appreciated.'"*'' 
In describing what might appear to many as an almost revolution-
ary attempt to subvert the dominant 'objective' order - yet one that, as 
Hannah Arendt also observed, will not simply fade away with time, but 
is rather inherent to humanity'*^ - he critiques this view strongly by 
asserting that such criticism falls short of objectivity, 
[...] by failing to write into its theory of social classes the primary 
truth against which it was conscructed, in particular the veil of sym-
bolic relations without which, in many cases, class relations would 
not be able to function in their 'objeccive' trurh as relations of exploi-
tation. In other words, objectivism forgets that misrecognition of 
the reality of class relations is an integral part of the reality of those 
relations.'*' 
This misrecognicion is what allows for a constitution of the daily activity 
of most social networks. The logic of practice, Bourdieu asserts, is pre-
cisely a logic of the everyday (e.g. f rom cooking and walking to marriage 
and representations of time or gender) that believes in its own legitimacy 
to the point that it can no longer recognize why it began believing this 
logic in the first place.'" The person immersed in the social symbolic 
space cannot in essence see outside or 'beyond' the structures that make 
everyday life possible, and i t is on this condition of forgetfulness that a 
repetition of the everyday subsists. This habitus — as the schema of the 
everyday is here termed - produces a worldview that is dissociated from 
its theoretical edifice. The everyday functions without a conscious 
knowledge present as necessary to cause its operacion. This is nonetheless 
how a person constructs their world, a construct that eludes theoretical 
description, but nonetheless is total ." 
Those who live on the level of the everyday, immersed in the habitus 
and not on the level of feigned 'objectivity' therefore, in Bourdieu's 
words, 
[...] can make nothing of universes that have not performed such a 
dissociation and so have, as it were, an economy [of distribution and 
representadon] in itself and not for itself Thus, any partial or total 
objectification of the archaic economy chat does not include a theory 
47. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 141. 
48. Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin, 2006). 
49. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 136. 
50. This same extended argument is put forward more concisely in Bourdieu's 
Outhne ofa Theoiy of Practice, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977). 
51 . Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 76. 
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of the subjective relation of misrecognition which agents adapted to 
this economy maintain with its 'objective' (chat is, objectivist) truth, 
succumbs to the most subtle and most irreproachable form of 
ethnocentrism.'^ 
The economy that functions within a given worldview appears as the 
only option, giving it an apparently inherent 'archaic' quality. This false 
form of 'objectivity' that develops through economic relations becomes 
the very backdrop of a particular worldview that refuses to acknowledge 
its own deliberate misrecognitions and yet passes as the 'natural' habitus 
in which a community is invested. This situation again (re)affirms the 
fact, for Bourdieu, that one's habitus is believed in rather than objectively 
viewed; it is as entirely personal as it is constituent of one's identity and 
therefore is liable to construct itself on the various 'blind spots' that i t 
ignores. Bourdieu makes clear that belief is 'an inherent part of belong-
ing' to a social field, one where the decision to enter it is less relevant 
than how that field works upon the subject: "That is why one cannot 
enter this magic circle by an instantaneous decision of the wil l , but only 
by birth or by a slow process of co-option and initiation which is equiva-
lent to a second b i r th . " " 
To avoid this 'ethnocentric' perspective (and I would here add that 
the labels patriarchal, racist or heteronormative are likewise applicable 
since these are formed much on the same basis), a critical form of self-
reflexivity needs to be generated from luithin the bounds of each particu-
lar habitus, and not necessarily from without, something Bourdieu makes 
evident. Yet the difficulty of gaining a self-reflexive awareness within 
these social networks, including theology (which is here my particular 
focus ad intra), is thus particularly acute insofar as what is culturally 
arbitrary often comes across in these contexts as 'natural ' .These net-
works are what maintain the particular 'nature' of the people who con-
stitute its community and who come to 'believe' in the integrity of its 
boundaries. 
The demonstration of a contrast between believing in rhe social 
and cultural boundaries of a community in general and believing in the 
community which is the Church specifically, I would only add, is there-
fore doubly problematic. A t the heart of the matter, there is often no 
way pracdcally pronounceable in which to articulate differences in the 
52. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, 113. 
53. Ibid. , 68. 
54. See Bourdieu, Musculiiie Domination, trans. Richard Nice (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2001), 2. 
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structures of believing, and thereby to differentiate, for example, 
between belief in the Church as the body of Christ and belief in the 
Church as social construct of security and identity. Making this distinc-
tion, however, as well as getting people within the Church to assume 
the vital willingness to change their perspectives on such structures, is 
necessary for transformations to occur on the path toward jusdce and 
the greater expression of the truths that define a communal body of 
believers.'' 
The plane of self-reflexivity is in general fraught with the tensions 
of desire, of not wanting to alter that which in fact forms our personal 
sense of self as Michel de Certeau pointed out some time ago."" This 
reality also, no doubt, speaks directly to why a rejection of comments 
critical to one's habitus often seems to be the norm. This reality is the 
site, Bourdieu reminds us, where theology in particular has historically 
developed an 'imaginary anthropology', "obtained by denial of all the 
negations really performed by the 'economy'" of symbols and cultural 
and pohtical representations.''' In Bourdieu's estimation, theologians in 
particular would do well to register caution when dictating principles 
that conflict with actual functioning economies within the world. This 
is not, however, and as Bourdieu again reminds us, a justification of the 
status quo, but a manner by which to unveil those imagined theological 
anthropologies that might actually be sustaining an ideological, hegem-
onic and ethnocentric discourse at their core. 
At the very least, these reflections should prompt us to reconsider 
what ideological discourses lie embedded within the core of Church 
teachings or theological discourses, as well as the centrality given to doc-
trinal formuladons which, in this sense, perhaps serve rather as obstacles 
to formulating a more accurate Christian conception of the body of 
doctrine. For this very reason, Bourdieu's ardculation of a proper cri-
dque of dominance should be revisited properly in relation to ecclesiasti-
cal structures. His warnings concerning dominance - first, that it must 
appear as natural as possible, though working vaguely through the modes 
of a feigned objectification; second, that i t is daily, personal and perva-
sive, going into rhe deepest levels of society in order to perpetuate itself 
as by its nature dominance must; and third, that i f the specific manifest 
55. The idea o f crit iquing the Church as an institution is certainly not a new idea 
in the history o f theology, f rom Augustine's City of God to Avery Dulles' model of the 
Church as institution. See Avery Dulles, Models of the Church (New York: Image, 1991). 
56. Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life, trans. Steven Rendall (Berkeley, 
CA: Universit)' of California Press, 1984). 
57. Bourdieu, The Logic of I'ractice, 134. 
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institutions of dominance are not chemselves illustrated, we are in danger 
of merely reinforcing their agendas — must not be placed aside and for-
gotten. Rather, they should be articulated and expressed even more 
directly, and, we might add, wi th an ear toward more clearly expressing 
the heart of what it means to deal with confessional religious truths.'^ 
Authority and Power 
From Bourdieu's perspective, authority itself rests on an arbitrary 
grounding, a foundation that wi l l not be able to receive any external 
legitimization and so must mask its 'nature'.'' For this reason, a drama 
unfolds berween those who seek to conceal and those who seek to reveal 
this 'secret' nature of authority. What Bourdieu wishes to do is not only 
to engage in a deconstruction of the mechanisms of power and authority, 
but also to lessen the violence that such a concealment could be said to 
produce. This is what wi l l characterize the background against which he 
wi l l seek to portray the tensions (of dominance and subordination) 
between gendered representations, an example he took up on occasion. 
Traditionally, those in positions of dominance, themselves immersed in 
power, have had a vested interest in concealing the grounds of their own 
(sovereign) authority, a situation which often results in a certain circular-
ity of argumentation. Accordingly, the concealment of authority's 
arbitrariness becomes the main ruse of dominance provided through the 
lack of justification given for power and its pronouncements. 
This is encapsulated when Bourdieu alternately characterizes mas-
culine speech — as only one prominent instance of this tactic, but a 
major one at that - as retaining dominance through its being an isolated 
set of verdicts, or pronunciations of order (blessings and curses). Femi-
nine speech, on the other hand, becomes that which subverts masculine 
dominance though a comprehensive logic illustrating both a "question-
ing of necessicy and an affirmation of contingency."''" The latter, there-
fore, likewise allows, tolerates or even thrives on a certain ambiguity, 
while the former tends toward a universalized, monolithic or polarized 
speech. Theological discourse has certainly yet to catch up to Bourdieu's 
58. Bourdieu, The Logic of Pritctice, 129-133. For a more detailed systematic look 
at how male domination plays a central role in societal constructs appearing as natural, 
see Bourdieu's Masculine Domination. 
59. See Pierre Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 94. 
60. Bourdieu, Masculine Domination, 70-71. 
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analysis, especially when it is engaged in analyzing theological or dog-
matic positions that often appear through what could only at times seem 
to align itself wi th the latter set of characteristics. 
What further complicates matters a great deal, though, is not that 
universalized statements should cease to be given - indeed they are in 
some sense necessary for identity formation, its rites and rituals of insti-
tution''' - but rather that it would be a failure of theology not to distin-
guish speech acts of domination from its other discourses. We might be 
justified, for example, in asking i f male theologians in particular can 
distinguish in their writings an act of masculine dominance, either in 
verbal or physical form, from an act supposed to convey or interpret 
God's word, both internally and externally. The difficulty in separating 
motives, both individual and ecclesial, is quite large here, especially in 
pastoral terms insofar as priests (as men) in the Catholic and Orthodox 
traditions, for example, convey God's image in Christ. But it is essential 
to distinguish these different registers in order to avoid performing a 
continuous systemic violence upon both women and men,''^ 
The foundations for the use of such a force lie upon what Bourdieu 
characterizes as a 'mystical' foundation for authority, the site from which 
law itself is said to spring - a point affirmed by Jacques Derrida as well.'' ' 
This brings us to inspecting the necessity of the force behind authority, 
a force which can be either more or less violent. Bourdieu defines the 
foundation for this authority as that which does not have an inherent 
justification; i t only appears as the force itself which legitimates a 
6 L See Bourdieu, Pascalian Meditations, 245. 
62. Perhaps we can sense the diff icul ty of removing the embeddedness of patriar-
chal norms, the tactics of masculine domination which Bourdieu speaks of, through an 
historical, and strongly ecclesiological, example. John Paul II's apostolic letter Mulieris 
Dignitatem, i n contrast to its normal method of reference, citation and explanation to 
justify its claims, simply states how it is 'commonly thought' that women are more atten-
tive to others than men, using the phrase alone to justify its validity. John Paul I I , 
Mulieris Dignitatem, 15 August 1988, § 1 8 . Accessed online at http://w2.vatican.va/con-
tent / john-pauI- i i /en/apostJet ters / I988/documents/hf_jp- i i_apLl98808I5_mulier is-
dignitatem.html. This phrase, and there are many others one could potentially cite f rom 
contemporary Catholic Church teaching in particular to illustrate the point, touches the 
border o f the danger that Bourdieu refers to as the masculine practice of'dispensing wi th 
justification*, an act that can only be performed as such by those in positions o f power 
who seek to legitimate their authority through force alone. Bourdieu, Masculine Domina-
tion, 9. This act, according to Bourdieu, is most often rendered as claims of 'common 
sense' which convert opinion into what is intended to appear as 'natural' wi th in a certain 
context. Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Syiiibolic Power, ed. John B. Thompson, trans. 
Matthew Adamson (Cambridge, M A ; Harvard University Press, 1991), 131. This is the 
manner in which someone can be said to 'become' what they already are, recalling 
Simone de Beauvoir's dictum that "one is not born, but becomes a woman." Simone de 
Beauvoir, The Second Sex {^ew Yotk: Bantham, 1952), 249. 
63. See Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 49. 
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particular, though thoroughly contingent, order. What is to disdnguish 
this 'mystical' foundation in its mythological, religious or nationalistic 
guises remains however less clear, and it is not an issue that is easily 
addressed, though there is a great need to do so. There is little doubt, 
however, that the 'force of law' which these symbolic utterances convey 
necessarily resists the ambiguity of law's foundations in order to promote 
identity through a stable social ordering, the symbolic ritual interests 
which found the social boundaries of cultural intelligibility.'''* Indeed, 
the order which certain theological or ecclesial statements reinforce 
through their promotion of specific norms often appear as fundamental 
to resisting the structures of 'sin' and 'chaos' which would otherwise 
abound (or at least the fear of such things abounds). 
Many questions are also opened up by a general realization of the 
arbitrariness of signifying claims as opposed to (ontological) truth 
claims, and perhaps theology's failure in this regard has been simply to 
follow suit in not making this distinction clearer, for it is precisely this 
distinction between them that is essential for understanding difference 
as constitutive of identity itself This distinction plays a pivotal role, 
for example, in discerning the levels of responsibility apparent in the 
usage of a signifying power, such as when we ask: what justice could 
possibly be done in redrawing the line(s) between identities elsewhere 
than the prevailing current norms? Who benefits f rom these juridical 
(re)drawings, perhaps in many ways analogous to the political practice 
of gerrymandering? Who is thereby included or excluded? What types 
of arguments for increased representation wi l l be acceptable (or heard) 
and for what reasons wi l l this be so? In short, who stands to lose power 
and who to gain i t by signifying things differendy? I would only add 
at this juncture that we might note as well the significance potentially 
open to hybrid identities and those contexts where instances of muldple-
belonging arise, mainly, f rom comparative theological studies and 
which are yet central to our discussion of what constitutes the subject 
matter of theology proper.''' 
64. See Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 11 Sff. See also the affinity which 
Bourdieu's use of the phrase 'force o f law' shares w i th Jacques Dernda's usage in his essay 
"Force o f Law: The 'Mystical Foundation o f Author i ty ' , " in Acts of Religion, ed. G i l 
Anidjar, trans. Mary Quaintance (London: Routledge, 2002). 
65. O n hybrid identities, see, among others, H o m i K. Bhabha, The Location of 
Culture (London: Routledge, 1994); on multiple belonging, see, in particular. Rose 
Drew, Buddhist and Christian^ An Exploration of Dual Belonging (London; Routledge, 
2011). For a contestation o f gendered binary categorizations, which I feel is highly rel-
evant in this context, see, e.g., Judi th Butler, Undoing Gender (London: Routledge, 
2004). 
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The lack of justification for an utterance which conveys the 'force 
of law' can be seen as a necessity for social order, yet it is not one which 
is removed from all cridque; indeed, its reladon to 'Truth' may remain 
at times completely unstated, though needing perhaps to be the thing 
stated most clearly of all. In ali of this, the essential question remains: to 
what degree does a contingently established order seek to promote justice 
(thereby lessening the violence it perpetuates) and not simply to legiti-
mate its own dominance (thereby increasing rhe violence it performs).' 
Bourdieu's efforts to develop a 'non-violent' communication, attempdng 
to 'reduce as much as possible the symbolic violence exerted', provides 
no easy oudet that would negate all responsibility for the violences that 
are committed in order to establish cultural legibility.'''' In the end, there 
is no simple (absolute) polarization possible in order to conduct a litmus 
test for violence, only a sliding scale which implicates all inasmuch as 
each discourse expresses new avenues for potential liberation as well. 
What we are left wi th then, as I noted in the beginning, is an embodied 
tension from which we cannot simply be removed. 
Entertaining Religious Self-reflexivity 
Following from this analysis of just how the symbolic language of domi-
nance exerts its force, we see too how, for Bourdieu, an abstraction is a 
generalization, a thought-construct that is less fact than vaguely founded 
claim. To perform an act of abstraction is in some sense to perform a 
certain violence, to perform a reduction of the robust elements which 
comprise a more naturally complex scenario. A t the same dme, however, 
he recognizes that "[t]here is no politics of pure particularity."'''' Univer-
sal statements are the eventual outcome of a particular posidon, a neces-
sary abstraction of sorts, which coalesce upon the horizon of what con-
stitutes the 'polidcal' in the first place. Their use, however, though 
inevitable, should be guarded and used with caution, for at their worst, 
abstractions become, in another sense, tools of the purely ideological. 
In fact, the ideological use of abstraction results from what Bourdieu 
characterizes as a universalized position which seeks to remove itself from 
its particular context, thus refusing to 'objectify' its own objectivity. The 
66. Pierre Bourdieu, et al., The Weight ofthe World: Social Suffering in Contem-
porary Society, trans. Priscilla Parkhurst Ferguson et al. (Oxford; Polity, 1999), 609. 
67. Ernesto Laclau, "Constructing Universality," in Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau 
and Slavoj Zizek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the 
Left (London; Verso, 2000), 305. 
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violence which results is the violence of asserting a universal statement 
as the only form of one's particularity, thereby effacing the traces of the 
particular which would be seen as a contamination of a 'purer' universal 
rationale.''^ Situated within the confines of these remarks, we might 
then, as a task sdll in need of much explanation beyond simply inquinng 
as to the particularides of a certain abstracted theological position which 
professes to understand or define the norms of other contextual posi-
tions, elaborate upon what defines the embodied posidon from which 
specific theological writings or positions emerge. That is, what allows a 
theologian to proceed in their work as i f their own autobiographical 
context did not matter? 
We might take, for example, the Pope John Paul II's letter on the 
'dignity' of women, Mulieris Dignitatem, that does not first take into 
account the posidons of the men who wrote it. In the absence of such a 
letter on men and their role(s) in society f rom a theological perspective, 
though there have been critical voices which call for such a letter to be 
written,'' ' for example, we are left to assume that the letter on collabora-
tion between genders in a Catholic context promotes a universalized 
speech which yet must fail in some sense to account for its own (sexual) 
particularity, thus running the nsk of condoning or insdgadng an unac-
knowledged but felt violence.^" From another angle, we might also 
68. Bourdieu, Masculine Domination, 62. 
69. See Camilla J. Kari, Public Witness: The Pastoral Letters of the American Catholic 
Bishops (ColIegeviUe, M N : Lirurgical Prejis, 2004), 127. 
70. M y analysis here almost reaches a definitive (though almost ironic) moment 
as the letter in question, Mulieris Dignitatem, the one which does exist on the collabora-
tion of genders, propounds and disseminates what could only be described as a series of 
abstractions, though ones that are not altogether unaware (in some sen.se at least) o f their 
being abstractions. A n d therein lies the dif f icul ty o f discerning their meaning, or even i f 
there is a deeper irony present in their articulation. The potential for irony is in fact great 
as the 'force' o f these statements does seem to be invested primarily in generating and 
confirming the socially dominant (perceived) boundaries of gender identity thtough a 
series of abstractions. For example, i t is said that women have a unique 'capacity for the 
other', they 'preserve the deep intui t ion o f goodness in their lives o f those actions which 
elicit life' , they are marked by a 'capacity to give l ife ' (i.e. motherhood), they 'acquire 
maturity very quickly', they hold a 'sense and a respect for what is concrete', they 'possess 
a singular capacity to persevere in adversity, to keep life going even in extreme situafions, 
CO hold tenaciously to the future, and finally to remember wi th tears the value o f every 
human life' , and chey are 'opposed to abstractions which are so fatal for the existence of 
individuals and society'. A certain reductionism, no doubt, takes place here, and it is one 
yet intended co safeguard a woman's freedom chough perhaps wi th che (un)incentional 
consequence of l imit ing i t in other ways. So then, we have, in some sense, a series of 
abstractions issued in order to avoid the 'fatal abstractions' which do harm to che exis-
cence of boch individuals and society, a series which draws a distinction berween the 
different forms of abstraction possible, some o f which the Church apparently does find 
itself wi l l ing to create, at lease i f we are Co cake this letter at face value. I t is not, however. 
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inquire as to how a universalized statement could be issued without yet 
denying its particular grounding, and, furthermore, how that foundation 
sustains such a universalized position. 
The violence done in pursuing such a false form of 'objectivity' is 
potentially double: not only are there those who become marginalized 
within a dominant paradigm, but there are even those within a domi-
nant position itself who must marginalize, or repress, parts of themselves 
in order to become more 'objecdve', or more 'universal'. This reality is 
something which Bourdieu himself has linked to the role of priests 
through the act of 'becoming holy', a process that threatens to detach a 
man from his own social sense of 'being a man' in a given context (and 
along with whatever such a thing entails).^' The problem, again, is not 
simply that a form o f universality is presented in the form of an abstrac-
don, but that a form of universality is presented as the site of its own 
particularity, as i f no other historical-empirical context grounded its 
articulation. This is what Bourdieu calls the 'eternalization' of a particu-
lar position seeking to deny its particularity.^^ 
Perhaps we should be seeking, rather as Bourdieu suggests, a pro-
ject which attempts to 'objectify objectivity' itself - that is, to recognize 
how the tensions we are caught in wi l l never really go away.''' This 
would be to engage in an always asymptotic progression toward truth 
and justice, respecting the limitations which humanity has before it and 
unmasking the failures of attempting to be truly 'objective' and there-
fore at a remove f rom one's own humanity, which would be to perform 
a perverse act of violence to one's self Like the evolution of a language 
which can become less racist or sexist over time, the individual can learn 
to eradicate such violences by allowing the repressed elements of what 
appears as entirely subjective to appear and to be integrated with the 
always already constructed narratives which comprise an individual's 
worldview.'''* 
entirely clear what type o f abstraction is being propounded here, or whether a difference 
in types o f abstraction is truly being asserted (as this document itself argues needs to be 
done) or whether the letter has accidentally slipped into a deeply ironic and contradictory 
position. O n this point at least the temptations to obfuscate are high and the needed 
clarity still much sought after. 
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In the end, this 'double bind' of power exerts a certain circular 
logic, one that pronounces unity at the same time as it produces deeper 
divisions, that is, as it forms an attempt to liberate while simultaneously 
imposing other restrictions. What this means is that power, as noted 
above, in its 'mystical' foundations, engages in a certain circularity in 
order to legitimate and regulate its usage - it has no foundadon to stand 
upon except the one it creates (and thus 'naturalizes' itself through this 
very act).^' As Bourdieu notes, this is the 'perfect circularity' expressed in 
the cycles of honor between men, an indication of its arbitrary nature 
through the various lines of its succession.'''' This is perhaps nowhere 
better exemplified than in the usage of symbolic language within certain 
theologies and within the Church, a terrain, as Bourdieu notes, which 
especially demonstrates the capacities for violence which a pardcular dis-
course could be said to utilize, even i f I might add, done under the rubric 
of 'apostolic succession' or working within a canonized set of authors. 
Bourdieu does occasionally hint that the maintenance of religious 
dogma, despite its at times arbitrary nature, is a necessity for providing 
social order as it aids the construction of the habitus that regulates our 
everyday realities. For this reason, he states that awareness alone of an 
arbitrary norm wil l not produce an effective change in social relations. 
Any perceived awareness must be accompanied by a corresponding 
change in the habitus, the practices of the body which function accord-
ing to a knowledge of their own — this is the only way in which to 
break its circular justification of its own authority.'''^ And this is to be 
done over and against the fact that symbolic power is constantly 
engaged in acts which serve either to secure or to betray the founda-
tions for trust and belief; symbolic power indeed defines the conditions 
upon which we can be said to believe in the first p lace .There is thus 
a belief in the teachings that constitute its universality or catholicity, 
but also a belief in the body that constitutes its everyday reality, the 
masses of persons who inform its particularity. Again, such is its circu-
lar nature. 
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What this also means, however, is that to break the circularity of 
established power relations, one must perform a self-reflexive act, either 
on the everyday level of the habitus or on the theoretical level of abstrac-
don. This distinction introduces an important qualification within an 
understanding of the Church as the body of Christ. That is, in order for 
the Church to (re)shape its own body, it must be attentive to this bifur-
cated reality, and so thereby disdnguish berween belief in a social body 
and belief in the body of Christ, and in no way simply renounce the 
necessity of social and political representadons. This is something that 
can in reaUty be done without the need for a full-scale R/reformation. 
In other words. 
Theology [...] can be understood [...] as a field of struggle for power 
to control the capital at stake, that is, the Christian symbol system. 
Conflicts in the field are not "merely theological," but also involve 
struggles for power. Somebody's interest is being served or under-
mined [ . . . ] . There is no disinterested theology. To pretend otheiwise 
is to disguise and thereby legitimate those interests.^' 
T. Howland Sanks' comments on Bourdieu's applicability to the field of 
theological discourse are deeply resonant with the overall aims of this 
study, for not only does Bourdieu assist in seeing the need for a self-
reflexive theological discourse, but he also utilizes his critique in order 
to point toward notions of a 'pure love' as formed in the home, between 
persons intimately connected, those who are democratically overcoming 
structural forms of domination, and coming to the center stage perhaps 
in deference to the often non-rational means of overcoming political 
obstacles.^" Like Charles Taylor's exploration of 'networks of agape' 
in his A Secular Age, what Bourdieu points toward with his notion of 
'pure love' is an almost Utopian hope that non-subordinated relations 
might exist in contexts where self-reflexive critique abounds, no matter 
whether this is locatable in one's home, family, the Church, another 
inscitudon or society on the whole. There is no 'purer' expression pos-
sible for either theologians or ecclesial efforts to assist in locating the site 
of 'pure love' it has claimed, and must continue to claim, to lead people 
toward no matter where it is to be found. The Church, from its own 
foundations, must search only to locate such a love within itself 
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Conclusion 
What 1 suggest concerning this quest to establish the self-reflexive foun-
dations of theological practice is that theologians must learn to be atten-
tive to the often, but not always, exclusive nature of naming, labeling, 
drawing boundaries and forming identities. They must learn to embrace 
the inherent (comparative) relationahty of doing theology, which also 
means that they can re-draw or re-negodate these reladons so as not to 
be as exclusionary as they, or the Church, had previously been. To return 
to our beginning, perhaps theology needs to take the comparative 
approach to theology much more seriously than it has ever done, not 
only to become increasingly aware of its limitations, but to realize that 
theologians always speak from particular, embodied contexts. Only by 
doing this will theology be able to deal with the reality of pluralism, dual 
belonging, the political formation of everyday theologies and a host of 
other complex realities in ways that more 'disciplinary' efforts are not 
able to. Theologians must learn, then, to be flexible in ways professional, 
guild theologians are often not.^' The theological resources for transfor-
mation in this regard are everywhere present. This may take place on the 
level of the seen or the unseen, the thought or the unthought. Or it can 
be a learning to 'see' beyond both levels, a seeing beyond, a thinking 
beyond. First, as in the end, theology must see itself as much as it sees 
beyond itself 
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